


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THE JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER (JFACC)

EVOLUTION...SELECTION...PERSPECTIVES

by

J.B. Hulick
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: J.B. Hulick

16 May 1995

Paper directed by Captain D. Watson
Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department

Faculty Advisor: L. Watson

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Abstract

JFACC Authority...Perspectives

The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept is an issue that produces a great deal of controversy in the joint arena. The questions of authority, and doctrine need to be examined. Specific authority is delineated by the Joint Force Commander (JFC), but vague doctrine, service parochialism and historical precedents confuse the issue. This paper will examine the JCS guidance, aviation perspectives and service views of the JFACC concept. The JFC designates a JFACC, if necessary; the JFACC's authority is defined by the JFC. The primary responsibility of the JFACC is to ensure a harmony of efforts to support the JFC's intent and concept of operations. The JFACC staff organization must be mission focused and flexible. Recommendations will be presented to help resolve the JFACC authority and doctrine controversy.

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The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

Authority... Perspectives

The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept presents a number of issues that need to be examined thoroughly. Vague joint doctrine confuses the issue since the JFACC's authority is interpreted differently by each of the services. Joint doctrine establishes the Joint Force Commander (JFC) who may designate a JFACC. The designation is situationally dependent, usually based on the JFC's concept of operations and number of functional or service components, Warfighting versus Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW), joint/combined operations, shore based or amphibious/afloat operations.

The lack of development of a single joint JFACC doctrine remains a stumbling block and is the source of disagreement among the services. Service parochialism and differences in historical and operational doctrine tends to inhibit the joint staff from prescribing a joint doctrine. The aviation assets of each service conduct varied missions using different doctrines. Therefore, each service wants to ensure their specific vision for conducting joint air operations receives the requisite visibility.

The result is the contentious idea as to the responsibilities of the JFACC. The U.S. Military is and will be a joint force. The overemphasis on who will be the JFACC and the structure of his supporting staff must be relegated to a position behind that of how the JFACC will be used to support the JFC and his mission.

BACKGROUND

U.S. air operations began prior to WWI, where three independent air forces were born (USAAF, USN, USMC). During the war the potential for air power to support ground troops was recognized and the first seeds were planted for strategic use of aircraft. After the war each service concentrated on developing aviation tenets to best support service doctrine. The Marine Corps in the "Banana Wars" operated as a constabulary force with little or no artillery support. They had air supremacy and used aircraft to substitute for artillery and naval gunfire.¹ The primary mission of aircraft was in direct support of ground forces. The USAAF was experimenting with developing an independent air force that would be centralized and have co-equal status with the other services. Strategic employment (long-range bombing) was the first priority, as demonstrated by General Billy Mitchell. The Navy was focused on integrating the carrier into the battleship fleet.²

During the early stages of WWII the same thinking prevailed. The USAAF, after experiencing the direct support of the ground commander tasking at Kasserine Pass, concentrated on becoming an independent force and strategic bombing in Europe. The USN used air to support the fleet in maritime operations, such as, Coral Sea, Midway. The USMC kept evolving the combined arms concept from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. The Marine Corps provided a great

¹ CNA, Naval Studies Group, The Navy and the JFACC: Making Them Work Together, CNR 202, (Alexandria, VA. Apr. 1993) p. 7.

² Ibid. p. 7.

deal of air support to General MacArthur, who thoroughly understood direct air support, throughout his Southwest Pacific operations. As WWII continued, at times the services were forced to conduct joint operations. The services combined in the Pacific to form the "Cactus Air Force", in 1942, which fought very effectively in the Solomons. Although a "JFACC" was not established, air operations were coordinated.³

The post-war brought about the creation of the USAF. The Air Force's attempts to gain control of USN & USMC assets caused a wider split in doctrine and increased parochialism. Air operations in Korea illustrated the lack of unity of effort and harmony.⁴ Effective cooperation was best exemplified during a crisis situation, such as the defense of the Pusan perimeter. In Vietnam, massive air power was available, including the helicopter, but fell victim to parochialism, bureaucracy and political in-fighting. Major issues separated the services, with the Air Force bombing of North Vietnam and Laos (strategic) role, lack of coordination of the helicopter on the battlefield and attempts at apportionment of sorties in support of ground forces.⁵

Service philosophies continued to be very distinct without any signs of compromise. The USAF was created because it can be used

³ M. Frietas and T. Parker, "Joint Force Air Component Commander-A Common Sense Approach", (Santa Monica Ca. Rand 1994) p. 5.

⁴ CNA, Naval Studies Group, The Navy and the JFACC: Making Them Work Together, p. 13.

⁵ M. Frietas and T. Parker, p. 6.

independently of surface forces, particularly in a strategic role. The USN employs aviation assets to support the fleet in conducting multiple missions. The USMC air assets are part of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), they are used to achieve the synergy that MAGTF displays.⁶

GUIDANCE

Guidance from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided a basic outline for establishing a doctrine. The Chairman states:

"... JFCs will normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC's concept of operations."⁷

The Chairman's guidance allowed for flexibility, perhaps too much. No set rules were established. The issue of how an overarching joint air structure should be established in the joint arena without infringing on subordinate commanders initiative was not addressed.

The Chairman recognized the need to further define the concept and stated in Joint Pub 3-0 :

...Joint Force Commanders should allow Service tactical and operational assets and groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet

⁶ CNA, Naval Studies Group, The Navy and the JFACC: Making Them Work Together, p. 15.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), CJCS, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, (Washington D.C. 23 Nov. 1992) p. 9. Joint Pub 3-0 defines Joint Force Commander (JFC): A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force, also called JFC.

the needs of the Joint Force Commander, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of the Service organizations.⁸

The intent was becoming more defined. The JFC may appoint a JFACC but should strive to ensure the subordinate forces do not lose their integrity, versatility and initiative.

DOCTRINE

The JFC is tasked to exercise operational control, issue mission orders to all components, define command relationships and organize assigned forces to ensure unity of effort. The JFC may appoint a JFACC based on the following factors:

1. The JFC's overall mission
2. Forces available to the JFC
3. The JFC's vision of the duration, nature, and extent of joint air operations
4. Ability to command and control joint air operations
5. Mission and tasks the JFC has assigned to subordinate commanders
6. The degree to which the assignment of a JFACC will enhance the combat effectiveness of the joint force as a whole.⁹

The JFC defines the JFACC's authority and will specify the extent and limits of that authority as early as possible in the planning process.¹⁰ This authority must be adroitly expressed to ensure the component commander's versatility and flexibility will not be hampered. The harmony of effort between the subordinate commanders is paramount to mission accomplishment.

⁸ JCS, Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 3-0, (Washington D.C. 1986) p. II-18.

⁹ U.S. Navy, Office of the CNO, JFACC Organization and Processes, NWP 3-56.1TP (NAVDOPCOM Norfolk, Va. Jan. 1995) p. 2-1.

¹⁰ Ibid, p 2-2.

The overriding point is a JFACC may be designated based on the situation. JFACC doctrine is a hybrid of the services approaches to employ air assets. The JFACC should be from the service with the preponderance of tactical assets and the best capabilities to accomplish the missions assigned by the JFC. The JFC prescribes the JFACC's authority. The JFACC can be assigned responsibilities to include planning, coordination, allocation and tasking based upon the JFC's apportionment decision.¹¹

The command relationship and level of coordination must be considered and stated by the JFC. The JFC can opt to designate a JFACC by service, functional component or JFC staff option. The service option implies a dual-hatted component commander who maintains control over subordinate forces. The JFC will establish authority and coordinating instruction between the Service commanders. The functional tasking " must not affect the command relationships between the Service component commanders and the JFC".¹² The functional component choice is task oriented, land, sea, and air. The designations JFACC, JFLCC (land), JFMCC (maritime) and JFSOCC (special operations) apply.

The JFC staff option allows JFACC duties to be performed by the staff as either an additional responsibility or that a separate arm of the JFC's staff be created for the unique missions as assigned by the JFC. The three options are established and have

¹¹ U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and operations Headquarters, USAF. JFACC PRIMER, (Washington D.C. Aug. 1992) p.13.

¹² NWP 3-56.1TP p. 2-2

been exercised: service component (Desert Storm), functional component (Tandem Thrust '92, JFC COMTHIRDFLT) and staff component (Urgent Fury, Grenada).¹³

Another interesting option is presented when the JFACC is afloat. Problems arise as to staff size, facilities limitations, platform capabilities, communications, interoperability and the possibility of a transfer of JFACC duties ashore once the battle moves away from the littoral areas.

PERSPECTIVES

The perspectives of the JFACC concept can be divided into three categories: 1) The focus of the doctrine, structural or mission. 2) The view of the aviation mission, planning and execution. 3) The individual service ideas of what the JFACC should do.

Current doctrine seems to focus on the structural organization of the JFACC but this approach establishes a set staff to accomplish a limited scope of operations. This doctrine can be too rigid and good for only one specific operational situation. Establishing this static JFACC concept becomes the goal rather than the means to accomplish the mission. A static structural focus guarantees a checklist mentality with an organizational bias that could hamper mission accomplishment.¹⁴ The priority becomes organization of the JFACC

¹³ Carl Pierson, JFACC: What It Means For The Amphibious Commander, Naval War College (Newport, R.I. May 1994) pp. 14-16.

¹⁴ M. Frietas and T. Parker, p. 17.

and not attaining the objectives. Mission success must always be the first priority. Since each mission is different, the JFACC must be flexible and able to organize according to the situation and concept of operations. Desert Storm, El Dorado Canyon and Urgent Fury imposed different requirements upon JFC, and all required a joint air effort. A mission-oriented joint staff and clear JFC guidance are requirements for every operation. This common thread can be defined as a harmony of effort. Each component of the force uses its assets to achieve the JFC's objectives, resulting in a synergistic effect.

The range of aviation options used to support the concept of operations and achieve objectives vary from the traditional, warfighting, strategic bombing as in the early phases of Desert Storm; to MOOTW, such as the humanitarian relief and no-fly zone enforcement in Somalia, Bosnia and Iraq. A JFACC organization that is structured for a traditional role of warfighting may have inappropriate personnel or expertise to "efficiently" accomplish the coordination of combined forces, non-government organizations (NGO) and government organizations to carry out a humanitarian mission (Somalia). Such a scenario dictates an airlift operation emphasizing logistics; but intelligence, air defense and ground forces may still be employed in various degrees at different phases. A Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) with its emphasis on ground forces and intelligence collection still requires logistics and air defense. In establishing a JFACC staff, doctrine should focus on tailoring a task organized organization

rather than a standard structure, the staff must maintain flexibility which will greatly enhance mission success.

Perhaps the most challenging problem is passing the JFACC functions from afloat to ashore.¹⁵ The entire staff structure and focus may shift as the phases change and the operation moves further inland and objectives change. The overriding goal is always mission success, be it non-traditional MOOTW or traditional warfighting scenarios. The issue of molding the organization to fit the mission requirements to ensure accomplishment must be the first priority.

There are two functional views on the way a JFACC can operate, horizontally or vertically. The horizontal lean contends that the JFACC, as a functional component commander, controls all assigned assets even when in a joint force with designated service components. This centralized management and across-the-board control mandates that all aviation assets be employed as a primary, independent force to influence the battle and achieve theater objectives; the JFACC commands the aviation assets. The JFACC, as a commander, may initiate actions autonomously. Autonomous actions by the JFACC can upset the allocation of air assets, making sorties unavailable at inopportune times. During Desert Storm preparation sorties for the amphibious landing in Kuwait and sorties against the Iraqi Navy were JFC assigned, but the sorties were not planned (on the ATO) by the JFACC. The sorties were conducted through

¹⁵ M Frietas and T. Parker, pp. 18-19.

designating those targets as secondary or tertiary and "flexing" aircraft to them once airborne.

The vertical view, on the other hand, maintains aviation as one of the elements required to achieve victory. The integration of air and surface capabilities is necessary and desirable to ensure mission success.¹⁶ Decentralized procedures and effective coordination are the cornerstones of the vertical view; the JFACC must coordinate aviation assets. Coordination of all air assets leads to the harmony of effort that is required for mission success, from humanitarian airlift to CAS. The vertical view ensures cooperation and integration of assets to support the JFC's concept of operations. The principle of unity of command allows for only a single path of operational control between a senior and his subordinate commanders. The horizontal/centralized or vertical/decentralized procedures reflect different philosophies regarding employment of aviation assets and the role of the JFACC.

The views of the USAF, USN and USMC generally revolve around these vertical and horizontal views and are determined by who will be the JFACC, the limits of authority and how to organize the staff. The JFACC will be designated by the JFC, based on the JFC's concept of operations and may come from any of the services. The question of the JFACC as commander or coordinator can be answered by JCS Publications 3-0 and 0-2. The JFACC is a commander based on the guidance and limitations prescribed by the JFC. The concept of unity of effort is interpreted differently by the Services. The

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 13

USAF maintains that unity of effort involves the centralized control by a single commander. The Navy and Marines contend that unity of effort means coordination and integration of air assets into the surface scheme. These service perspectives are "nothing more than different views of balance."¹⁷ The balance is influenced based on the mission and concept of operations.

The Air Force purports that the JFACC should centralize planning and execution control under a solitary commander. According to the JFACC Primer:

"The primary purpose of a JFACC is to provide unity of effort for employing air power for the benefit of the joint force as a whole."¹⁸

This indicates employing assets in a joint effort to support the land and maritime forces. Air power can range throughout the theater providing aerospace control, force application, force enhancement and force support.¹⁹ The Air Force may be overly concerned with integrating direct support requirements with their view of the air operations tasking. Under current doctrine, if the JFACC is from the Air Force, dedicated sorties to the JFACC pool would be:

- all USAF sorties
- Navy sorties as directed
- Marine sorties for long-range interdiction, long-range reconnaissance and air defense
- Marine sorties in excess of ground support requirements

¹⁷ J. Whitlow, "JFACC: Who's in Charge?" Joint Force Quarterly, (Summer 1994) p.64

¹⁸ JFACC Primer, p.11.

¹⁹ E. Houle, "JFACC-The Sequel" Marine Corps Gazette, (May 1993) p.84

If the assets are insufficient the JFACC would notify the JFC, since only the JFC could reallocate sorties.

The Navy prefers to implement the JFACC concept under a service component command relationship. The Navy wants to integrate the JFACC into the composite warfare commander (CWC) doctrine. CWC is a decentralized concept, based more on practice than doctrine, with control by negation (silence is consent) and is how the Navy manages air assets. The Navy, traditionally the lone wolf operator, should place more weight on the harmony of efforts. Each component of the joint force must employ its assets to achieve the JFC's objectives. The forces may "play in unison" or "play independently", but they must always play in harmony with the JFC's direction.²⁰ The Navy must be prepared to integrate into the joint force.

The Marine Corps considers the JFACC a coordinator of aviation functions as authorized by the JFC. Aviation is a supporting arm in conjunction with artillery and naval gunfire. These arms support the ground commander. Marines train and fight as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) with aviation the "A" of the MAGTF. The JFACC tasks sorties made available by the MAGTF and operational control (OPCON) of Marine TACAIR in sustained operations ashore is

²⁰ CNA, Naval Studies Group, The Navy and the JFACC: Making Them Work Together, p.4.

specifically assigned to the MAGTF commander.²¹ The 1986 Omnibus Agreement for the Command and Control of Marine TACAIR states in part:

"The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of his MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element...MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the (JFC) for tasking... for air defense, long range interdiction and long range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the (JFC)...for the joint force as a whole."

The distinctiveness of the MAGTF enables the commander to best determine his air requirements based on his direct command relationship with the JFC and his knowledge of the concept of operations. The MAGTF commander supports the apportionment decisions through "up front" sorties, the three longer range missions above and "excess" sorties. The MAGTF commander determines his requirements and advises the JFC on the amount of direct support sorties ("those that are authorized, planned, and executed by a component commander in direct support of his own missions, or those sorties needed by the component commander for the immediate defense of his forces")²² required. This process exemplifies an up-the-chain philosophy instead of the top-down approach. "The intent is to meet the needs of the JFC while maintaining tactical and operational integrity of the service

²¹ JFACC Primer pp. 8-9.

²² NWP 3-56.1TP p.4-5.

organizations."²³ Only the JFC can change the allocation of up front, excess or direct support sorties.

The fundamental philosophies of the Air Force and Naval Services differ. In the Air Force the air battle comes first and the organization of all air assets under a central manager provides the formula for victory. Air support is integrated at the highest level with the air component commander possessing operational control (OPCON) authority over all TACAIR assets. The Navy and Marine Corps maintain aviation is a piece of the total force, a supporting element of the overall campaign or operation. Aviation must be integrated into the joint plan to provide the synergistic effect through mission planning and coordination. To accommodate both these views, the JCS has delineated a JFACC that 1) may be designated by the JFC, according to his estimate, 2) has the authority as prescribed by the JFC 3) employs air power by integrating the services assets into the plan and 4) recognizes the unique warfighting capabilities of the MAGTF. The JFC is not obligated to designate a JFACC, nor make him a functional component commander or exercise OPCON over aviation assets. The existing Joint Doctrine is correct to advise the JFC that centralization may be valuable but not at the cost of reducing versatility, responsiveness or the initiative of subordinate commanders.

Each scenario must be examined separately, whether a planned or crisis intervention evolution, to determine if a JFACC

²³ JCS, A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts, p. 9.

organization is appropriate. Operation El Dorado Canyon (Libya 1986, a planned evolution) featured strikes by naval aircraft from carriers near the coast and Air Force aircraft from the United Kingdom without the designation of a JFACC. The services cooperated and planned joint strikes at different geographical locations displaying close coordination. By applying proper planning procedures, an effective method to integrate air in support of the campaign or joint operations plan can be determined, whether or not a JFACC is designated. Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) exemplified the other side of the process (designating a JFACC) in a non-traditional role. As intervention became imminent, planners determined the scope, objectives and forces. A humanitarian mission with a force structure emphasizing forcible entry and airlift, for a short duration, was planned. The phasing of the forces and nature of the mission allowed the integration of air support. The JFACC was a Marine, TACAIR was de-emphasized because of the increased requirement for airlift and helo support. Establishing and coordinating airspace were vital functions. Each plan is scenario driven, consequently the JFACC must be a flexible, mission/task oriented organization.

Conclusion

Every joint force operation will not require a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC); single peace enforcement, pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes may be examples. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) will decide if a JFACC is warranted, and the likelihood is that future operations will be relatively small, expeditionary,

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). When a JFACC is designated, the organization must focus on the mission and organize accordingly; structural concerns are not as important as mission accomplishment. Command relationships and the differences between joint and service doctrine must be delineated and understood. Each component of a joint force is responsible to the JFC, they must accomplish the tasks assigned while integrating their operations in harmony with the JFC's intent and concept. The JFC will organize his forces and designate a JFACC, if appropriate, whose authority will be prescribed by the JFC. The JFACC's major responsibility will continue to be the coordination of aviation assets from the forces (services) assigned to fulfill the campaign or operation's objectives. The JFACC should not assume that command of air assets is necessary. The JFACC commands those forces assigned to him by the JFC, but his primary value lies in his responsibility to coordinate and harmonize air operations. The JFACC concept has evolved into a most viable option, but it should not become another layer of control that reduces flexibility or responsiveness. The balance between independent use of air power and direct support utilization must be understood.

Recommendations

The lack of a published joint doctrine for JFACC continues to be the primary concern in conducting air operations. The friction caused by the existing vagueness hampers efforts. Joint Pub 3-56.1 (JFACC Procedures) should be expedited. Procedures to implement a published doctrine must be broad enough to allow for the

flexibility desired for different situations, MOOTW through traditional warfighting. The JFACC organization should focus on mission accomplishment and not its structure. The services must mutually agree on definitions and procedures; and although each service has its own doctrine, the key must be to secure the strengths of each and codify them into a single doctrine. Joint staff training and exercises should be conducted. The staffs should be manned appropriately with trained staff officers not just liaison officers. The USACOM/USCINCPAC JFACC Concept of Operations document provides a starting point for establishing procedures. The highlights of the document include a framework for employing a JFACC, appointment criteria for a JFACC, with a Table of Organization (Appendix A) that specifies billets by grade and service as well as a commitment to train personnel on a regular basis. Operational level courses should be developed for senior officers and their staffs, similar to the JFACC Theater Air Strategy Symposium (hosted by the USAF in Washington D.C.), but with an expanded format and more Naval Service participation. Equipment must be interoperable, the Contingency TACS (Theater Air Control System) Automated Planning System (CTAPS) is on the right track. Downsizing, decreasing budgets and the drive for efficiency dictate that joint operations will be the norm. Mission accomplishment is the goal and a joint doctrine should be developed and practiced to achieve that goal.

JFACC Nucleus Manning Requirements

1. The billet structure listed below identifies the JFACC personnel providing the nucleus of required expertise. Based on specific mission requirements for sustained 24 hour operations, additional personnel will be required. The JFACC will submit requirements for additional support via the chain of command to USCINCPAC/USCINCLANT J1. Components and supporting commands should be prepared to supply additional personnel when requested by USCINCPAC/USCINCLANT J1.

2. SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS: Each component commander must review service Special Access Programs (SAPs) to ensure JFACC staff augmentees provide the required expertise to coordinate Special Access Program use.

LINE	BILLET	CODE	GRADE	SVC	SOURCE	REMARKS
JFC1-01	JFACC	1115	07/08	AF	AFLANT/PAC	CURRENT/POST CVW CDR
JFC1-02	DEPUTY COMMANDER	13XX	06/07	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC2-01	ACOS INTELLIGENCE	8085	05/06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC2-02	D-ACOS INTELLIGENCE	1630	05/06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC2-03	TARGETEER	8085	03/04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	GOODFELLOW SCHOOL GRAD+1YR EXPERIENCE DESIRED
JFC2-04	TARGETEER	1630	03/04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC2-05	CURRENT INTEL	35A	02/03	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFC2-06	CURRENT INTEL	0202	02/03	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFC2-07	MC&G	8065	03	AF	AFLANT/PAC	MC&G
JFC2-08	MC&G	8065	03	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC2-09	ANALYST SUPERVISOR	3905/07	E7/E8	N	PAC/LANTFLT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-10	ANALYST SUPERVISOR	20150	E7/E8	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC2-11	ANALYST	0231	E5/E6	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFC2-12	ANALYST	96B	E5/E6	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFC2-13	ANALYST	20150	E5/E6	AF	AFLANT/PAC	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-14	ANALYST	IS	E5/E6	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC2-15	ANALYST	96B	E5/E6	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFC2-16	ANALYST	0231	E5/E6	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFC3-01	ACOS OPERATIONS	1115Q	06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	AIR/GND INTERDICTION EXPERIENCE
JFC3-02	STRIKE OPERATIONS	13XX	05/06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC3-03	AIR OPERATIONS	1115B/Q	05/06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	A-6 CVW STK LDR (POST COMMAND DESIRED)
JFC3-04	STRIKE OPS AIR/GND	13XX	05	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC3-05	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	7509	04	MC	MARPAC/LANT	AIR TO AIR (F-15/F-16) POST-DEPT HEAD FA-18 CVW STRIKE LEADER
JFC3-06	ELINT/AEW OPS	13XX	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC3-07	AIR DEFENSE/ESCORT	13XX	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC3-08	STRATEGIC OPS	1235Z	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC3-09	INTERDICTION OPS	1235E	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	F-117/FWIC GRAD
JFC5-01	ACOS PLANS	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFC5-02	INTERDICTION PLANS	1115B	05	AF	AFLANT/PAC	FA-18
JFC5-03	AWACS	1475T	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC5-04	TLAM STRIKE PLANS	1110/20	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	F-15E/FWIC GRAD
JFC5-05	FIRE SUPPORT	14A	04	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFC5-05A	TLAM OPS	1120	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	AWACS
JFC5-06	AIR/GND PLANS	1115N	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC5-07	STRIKE PLANS	7541	04	MC	MARPAC/LANT	TLAM EMPLOYMENT
JFC5-08	STRATEGIC PLANS	1235C	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC6-01	ACOS COMMUNICATIONS	4945A	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	MLRS/ATACMS
JFC6-02	COMM WATCH OFFICER	1XXX	03/04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	

LINE	BILLET	CODE	GRADE	SVC	SOURCE	REMARKS
JFC6-03	AIR C ² SYSTEM OFF	7208	03/04	MC	MARPAC/LANT	MACCS COORDINATOR
JFC6-04	COMMS OFFICER	25C	03/04	AR	ARPAC/LANT	GMF/SHF ARMY COMMS
JFC6-05	COMM WATCH NCO	RM23XX	E7	N	PAC/LANTFLT	SI COMMS
JFC6-06	ADP INSTALLER/OPR	2531	E5/E6	MC	MARPAC/LANT	WWMCCS OPERATOR
JFC6-07	WWMCCS	49251	E5/E6	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC6-08	RADIO OPERATOR	49251	E5/E6	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFCL-01	SOF LIAISON	TBD	06	AF	SOCAPAC/LANT	
JFCL-02	ARMY LIAISON	15A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFCL-03	USN LIAISON	13XX	06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFCL-04	USAF LIAISON		06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFCL-05	USMC LIAISON	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFCL-06	BCE TEAM CHIEF	13A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFCL-07	ALLIED AVIATOR	ANY AIR	06 EQ		VARIOUS	
JFCL-08	CNA	ANY	06 EQ	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFCL-09	SPACE LIAISON	TBD	06		VARIOUS	

JFACC AFLOAT MANNING REQUIREMENTS

LINE	BILLET	CODE	GRADE	SVC	SOURCE	REMARKS
JFA1-01	JFACC	13XX	07/08	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFA1-02	DEPUTY COMMANDER	1115X	06/07	AF	AFLANT/PAC	POST SEA DUTY INTEL STAFF
JFA2-01	ACOS INTELLIGENCE	1630	05/06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFA2-02	TARGETEER	8085	03/04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	GOODFELLOW SCHOOL GRAD +1 YR EXPERIENCE
JFA2-03	TARGETEER	1630	03/04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFA3-01	ACOS OPERATIONS	13XX	06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	A-6 CVW STK LDR (POST COMMAND DESIRED)
JFA5-01	ACOS PLANS	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	FLEET COMMS EXPERIENCE
JFA6-01	ACOS COMMUNICATIONS	1XXX	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFAL-01	SOF LIAISON	TBD	06	AF	SOCAPAC/LANT	
JFAL-02	ARMY LIAISON	15A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFAL-03	USAF LIAISON	13XX	06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFAL-04	USMC LIAISON	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFAL-05	BCE LIAISON	13A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFAL-06	ALLIED AVIATOR	ANY AIR	06 EQ		VARIOUS	
JFAL-07	CNA	ANY	06 EQ	N	PAC/LANTFLT	

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